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Abstract 
This paper analyses recruitment practices to Samhall, a state-owned company 
that provides sheltered employment for individuals with severe work disabili-
ties. Besides providing employment for disabled workers and rehabilitating 
them to employment outside Samhall, the company is expected to decrease its 
dependence on Government subsidies. This profitability goal may come into 
conflict with the recruitment goals, resulting in cream skimming effects. The 
job security offered at the company may also provide incentives at the individ-
ual level for using Samhall as a means of escaping unemployment rather than 
as an employer of last resort for the most disabled. 
The evidence regarding cream skimming is mixed; the recruitment-to-
Samhall hazards of the prioritised groups, i.e., individuals with intellectual or 
psychic disabilities, are significantly higher than the hazards for some, but not 
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all, disability groups. Individuals without disabilities tend to be hired by the 
company, which suggests creaming and is contrary to the guidelines. Finally, 
the Samhall hazard increases slightly with time in unemployment. This is con-
sistent both with Samhall acting as an employer of last resort and the existence 
of incentives among individuals to use Samhall in order to escape unemploy-
ment. 
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1 Introduction 
Functional impairment seems to afflict a non-negligible proportion of the work-
force in many countries. According to a 1998 Statistics Sweden survey, about 
17 per cent of the working population in Sweden considers itself work dis-
abled, i.e. that the work capacity is reduced because of a disability. Because of 
high unemployment among the work disabled, there are also special labour 
market programmes targeted exclusively to this group. Around 20 percent of 
labour market expenditures were spent on measures for the disabled in 2000 
(OECD, 2001) Moreover, there has also been a strong trend increase in partici-
pation in such programmes since the 1970’s (Skogman Thoursie, 1999). This 
development is not unique to Sweden. Many other countries exhibit a growing 
emphasis on various programmes for the disabled; in the US, for instance, dis-
ability insurance has grown to become the largest cash assistance programme, 
despite improving aggregate health (Autor & Duggan, 2003, Black et al., 
2002).  
In Sweden, the two largest labour market programmes for the work disabled 
are subsidised employment (lönebidrag) and sheltered employment, of which 
Samhall, a state-owned company, is the main provider. In addition, all tradi-
tional labour market programmes are open for the work disabled, and many of 
them are engaged in, e.g., educational programmes. Subsidised employment 
engaged on average some 50,000 participants in 1999, according to the Na-
tional Labour Market Board (AMS). There were around 33,000 disabled work-
ers in sheltered employment, of which the majority – over 80 per cent – are 
employed in Samhall. Sweden is among the countries that rely most heavily on 
subsidised employment for the work disabled, whereas other OECD countries 
focus more on training and non-subsidised employment (Bergeskog, 2001).  
  An important aspect of disability is that it is difficult to define, while associ-
ated (cash assistance) benefits for the disabled individual may be generous. 
This has prompted much research on the potential for moral hazard in disability 
insurance and its effect on labour supply (see, e.g, Autor & Duggan, 2003, 
Black et al., 2002, Bound & Waidmann, 1992, Gruber, 2000). Gearing expen-
ditures towards rehabilitation and work training programmes for the disabled, 
as in Sweden, may mitigate the problem by serving as an efficient work-test 
mechanism, to the extent that moral hazard among beneficiaries is important. 
The provision of handicap programmes may, however, also generate incentive 
problems. Under this regime, there is, among other things, a potential for cream IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  5 
skimming among programme providers. The difficulty of defining disability, in 
combination with loose monitoring, may leave room for programme providers 
to recruit participants without a disability or with less severe disabilities than 
required by the (central) government, in order to pursue other objectives. This 
possibility has received little attention in the previous empirical literature on 
the economics of disability, possibly because of lack of data.  
Heckman et al. (2002) analyse cream skimming in US programmes for the 
non-disabled (the Job Training Partnership Act). The authors conclude that the 
efficiency cost from cream skimming is small. Melkersson (1999a) finds evi-
dence of cream skimming among the disabled in Swedish programmes; indi-
viduals with a previous attachment to the labour market seem to be favoured as 
participants. However, programmes exclusively targeted on the disabled are not 
considered explicitly. Skogman Thoursie (1999) considers the selection of in-
dividuals into a vocational rehabilitation project (Unga Handikappade) for the 
disabled in Sweden. No direct evidence of cream skimming was found, but, 
e.g., individuals not living in institutions were more likely to be selected. This 
could suggest creaming, to the extent that such individuals are more capable 
than others. 
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the recruitment practices of 
Samhall. In doing so, we intend to especially consider the potential for cream 
skimming. It is also possible to examine duration dependence, e.g., whether in-
dividuals are more likely, given disability status, to enter Samhall as the unem-
ployment period proceeds. Such dependence may be due to the company’s ob-
jective to act as an employer of last resort, but may also reflect incentives for 
using Samhall in a manner not intended by the Government. The employment 
security offered at the company may shift preferences towards Samhall jobs as 
the unemployment period proceeds.  
Samhall’s main objective, as laid down by the Government, is to create 
meaningful employment for individuals with severe work disabilities. Workers 
with psychic, intellectual or multiple handicaps should be prioritised. There are 
also other goals – the company should, inter alia, be profitable and decrease its 
dependence on Government funding. It is not difficult to imagine potential con-
flicts between these objectives.  
In normal circumstances it is assumed that an employer wants to find a per-
son with a high capacity for work, and tries to minimise employee turnover 
among trained and productive employees. The situation for Samhall is the re-
verse; the company should employ disabled individuals with very low capacity IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   6 
for work, train these workers in order to increase their work capacity, and then 
encourage them to seek other employment when fully trained and rehabilitated. 
If Samhall can, and does, choose employees on grounds that are in conflict 
with stated recruitment guidelines, the benefits to society of the company’s ac-
tivities may be overestimated. Available evaluations of the social benefit of 
Samhall rest on the assumption that the opportunity cost of its disabled em-
ployees is zero, i.e., the workers were unemployed at the time of hiring and 
employed in the company because of very slim or non-existing chances of find-
ing employment elsewhere.
1 If persons with no or “too little” disability are 
hired, this assumption is obviously violated.    
 The data used in this study is a random selection of 10,000 unemployed in-
dividuals with work disabilities during the period 1995 to 1999. The recruit-
ment practices and the potential for cream skimming are examined by analys-
ing the determinants of the duration of unemployment until employment in 
Samhall, in general as well as conditional on participation in a programme for 
the disabled. It is crucial for the analysis that the data on disability are not 
measured with error. In order to gain information about the prevalence of such 
errors, we examine changes in disability status as well as the determinants of 
the external employment hazard for the subset of individuals who have found 
employment at Samhall. External employment is defined as either regular jobs 
or subsidised employment.   
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of 
the Samhall company, its goals and recruitment practices. The data set, contain-
ing disabled individuals registered as unemployed with the public employment 
service (PES), is presented in Section 3. This section also contains a discussion 
on the difficulty of defining and measuring disability. Section 4 presents the 
econometric findings and Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                      
1 In 1997, the social benefit of Samhall was estimated at 677 million SEK, which is equivalent to 
approximately 75 million Euros (SOU 1997:64). See also Haavisto et al. (1993). IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  7 
2 The Samhall company
2  
Samhall is a limited liability company and part of Sweden’s active labour mar-
ket policy. Samhall is the second largest wholly state-owned Swedish enter-
prise, as measured by the number of employees, and the country’s largest sub-
contractor. It employed some 27,000 workers with disabilities in 1999. Em-
ployment is created by producing goods and services, which should be mar-
keted on equal terms with other businesses. About 60 per cent of employees 
work in the production of goods, and the other 40 per cent produce services. 
Industrial products include electronics, furniture, cabling, packaging, telecom 
components and mechanical engineering. Among the services supplied are 
property services, cleaning, information technology support, service of techni-
cal aids, domestic services and catering services. The workplaces are spread 
out across the country where there is considered to be a need for job opportuni-
ties for the disabled. The geographic locations are determined jointly with the 
National Labour Market Administration (AMV).   
Government support to Samhall, 4,262 million SEK (about 470 million Eu-
ros) in 1999, covers roughly 90 per cent of the salaries paid to disabled em-
ployees. The cost of providing full-time employment for one worker is on av-
erage 21,000 SEK (2,300 Euros) per month, which is about twice as much as 
the average subsidy required for one month’s full-time employment with wage 
subsidies outside Samhall. The Government compensates Samhall for its addi-
tional costs, compared to other companies. The additional compensation should 
cover costs primarily for an adapted work pace, support measures for the work 
adaptation and costs incurred because employees with functional impairments 
are not laid off when there is a decline in the demand for Samhall’s goods and 
services.
3 
Samhall’s objectives are to provide meaningful employment for individuals 
with severe work disabilities, and rehabilitate employees so that employment 
                                                      
2 This section is based on information contained in Samhall’s publications “Group review and 
annual report”, various issues, and “Personalberättelse”, various issues, if not otherwise indi-
cated.  
3 According to a study by the Swedish National Audit Office (1999), the average work capacity 
of a Samhall employee is about 70 per cent of the work capacity of a person without a work dis-
ability. State subsidies are calculated under the assumption of a 40 per cent work capacity, which 
means that the actual work capacity among Samhall employees is considerably higher on average 
than the work capacity presumed in the determination of the state subsidies. IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   8 
elsewhere (possibly subsidised employment) becomes possible. Recruitment 
should be targeted to disabled individuals with “difficulties on the labour mar-
ket”. Samhall is also supposed to fulfil a specific set of measurable goals, de-
termined by the owner. The targets, which, according to the company, are 
“equally important”, are set on an annual basis. In 1999, the targets were the 
following: 
 
•  Recruitment from prioritised groups; more than 40 per cent of new re-
cruits should belong to a prioritised group (determined by the owner), cur-
rently people with intellectual or psychic disabilities or multiple disabili-
ties.  
•  Transitions to employment outside Samhall; more than 3 per cent of 
employees should find other employment, possibly subsidised, each year.  
•  Number of work hours supplied by disabled employees; Samhall should 
provide almost 32 million work hours, equivalent to about 17,800 full-time 
employment contracts. 
•  Profitability; Samhall should have a positive financial result (given current 
Government subsidies), and decrease the dependence on Government fi-
nancial support. 
 
It is not hard to see that these goals may be conflicting. Most importantly, the 
targeting towards individuals with the most severe disabilities should decrease 
profitability. As the most productive employees are the ones most likely to find 
jobs outside Samhall, the goal regarding transitions may also reduce profits.        
 
2.1 Recruitment to Samhall 
A job seeker does not apply for a vacancy in Samhall, but is assigned to a job 
opening. Public employment service (PES) officials (or the branch in the PES 
that deals specifically with the work disabled) are responsible for selecting in-
dividuals who can be considered suitable candidates for an opening in Samhall. 
The PES is normally expected to make an assessment of the individual and his 
or her abilities, and direct the individual to employment in Samhall, subsidised 
employment or other work-related activity. These possibilities should also be 
discussed with the unemployed individual, and the prospective employer. 
However, the availability of vacancies in Samhall depends on job openings 
in the local Samhall workplace. The company is not expanding its workforce, 
so recruitment of new employees occurs mainly because other employees leave IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  9 
the company.
4 PES officials state that there are too few vacancies in Samhall to 
cover the perceived need for such employment (SOU 1997:64). 
Since the need for sheltered employment generally is greater than the num-
ber of vacancies, the local Samhall workplace could potentially choose among 
prospective employees on grounds that are contrary to the recruitment targets. 
A trial period of employment is sometimes used to train individuals and assess 
whether the individual is suited for work in Samhall. This period can be used 
by the local Samhall workplace to assess ability, and could be used as a sorting 
device. Sometimes the local Samhall workplace can choose among several in-
dividuals and choose the one best suited to the job, as a normal employer 
would, instead of employing the individual most in need of sheltered employ-
ment, as assessed by the PES office or other agents who can assign individuals 
to employment in Samhall. In light of this, it is not evident whether it is the 
PES officials that select individuals who are to be employed in Samhall, or if 
the local Samhall workplace has a substantial influence on the selection of new 
recruits. Thus we conclude that cream skimming in connection with the re-
cruitment practices of Samhall cannot be ruled out a priori.  
Even if individuals with severe disabilities should be prioritised, there is of 
course some minimum of work capacity required for employment in Samhall. 
If the minimum is not met, early retirement is a likely outcome. For disabled 
workers above the minimum work capacity, but with slim chances of getting a 
regular job, participation in other handicap programmes seems to be the main 
alternative to a Samhall job. How attractive, then, is employment in Samhall 
relative to participation in other handicap programmes for the individual 
worker? Since disabled employees are not laid off due to declining demand, 
there seems to be more employment security in Samhall than in, e.g., subsi-
dised employment.  
Average wages in Samhall are slightly lower than the industry average, but 
the most productive workers should receive wages on a par with those of out-
side jobs (Haavisto et al., 1993). Considering the reduced work pace at Sam-
hall, the most productive workers may find the offered wage attractive. How-
ever, it is possible that there is a stigma associated with employment in Sam-
hall, which may well be larger than for subsidised employment. We thus do not 
                                                      
4 In 1999, 2,608 new employees were hired. In general, the number of new recruits to Samhall 
has amounted to around 1,000 per year. 
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know whether there also is an important element of self-selection, besides se-
lection by PES officials and possible cream skimming by Samhall, in the re-
cruitment process.       
 
 
3 The data  
The data set used in this study is a subset of HÄNDEL, a database maintained 
by the Swedish Labour Market Board (AMS). The database contains informa-
tion on every individual registered as unemployed at the PES office. Daily in-
formation about unemployment status is available from August 1, 1991.This in-
formation states whether the individual is openly unemployed, i.e., can take a 
job immediately, or participates in a labour market programme, and if so, in 
which type of programme. There is also some background information about 
the individuals. Additional information on the employment history and escape 
routes for the individuals in HÄNDEL who found jobs at Samhall was obtained 
directly from the company.
5   
The subset used in this study is a sample of 10,000 unemployed persons 
with work disabilities. Of those individuals with work disabilities who were 
registered as unemployed on March 31 in 1995-1999, 2,000 persons were ran-
domly selected each year. The data set consists of the unemployment histories 
of the selected individuals from January 1, 1992 until October 31, 1999. Un-
employment spells beginning before January 1, 1992 were omitted. Because of 
the stock sampling procedure, unemployment duration tends to be longer for 
the individuals in this data set than for the average unemployed, since the stock 
at each moment holds a disproportionate number of long-term unemployed. 
Because of errors in the data set, the unemployment history of 553 individu-
als had to be discarded.
6 In addition, around 600 individuals were excluded be-
cause they had only one unemployment spell, and this spell began before Janu-
ary 1, 1992. This group consists mainly of individuals in subsidised unem-
ployment. After the exclusions, there were 8,849 individuals, with 23,878 un-
employment spells, in the data set. 
                                                      
5 The data were kindly provided by Britt Hellström at Samhall.  
6 An unemployment history was discarded if at least one unemployment spell had a negative du-
ration. IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  11 
In this study, an unemployment spell is defined as a period when the indi-
vidual is registered with the PES office, and is either openly unemployed or in 
a mainstream labour market programme, i.e., not in a programme for the handi-
capped. The motivation behind this definition is that we are interested in inves-
tigating the factors influencing escapes to Samhall (and other handicap pro-
grammes), as opposed to escapes to other types of labour market programmes.  
Not all individuals were classified as work disabled during all of the unem-
ployment spells. Some persons have changed disability status between unem-
ployment spells, either from being work disabled to not being disabled, or vice 
versa. There were 15,483 unemployment spells during which the individuals 
were classified as being work disabled. 
The data contain objective information on work disability, which is rarely 
available. Typically, researchers have to rely on subjective information about 
functional impairment or on objective information, such as medical reports, 
that may not be perfectly correlated with work disability. Subjective and objec-
tive data of this kind tend to generate various biases in the effects of health and 
retirement benefits on, e.g., labour force participation (Bound et al., 2001). 
Thus it is an advantage that our data are based on a direct measure of work dis-
ability by the PES office. However, there are some limitations also with the 
data used in this study. For instance, it should be noted that only incidence is 
recorded, and there is no information regarding the severity of the disability or 
an assessment of the reduction of working capacity. The type of disability is re-
corded, i.e., heart and/or lung disease, hearing, vision or motion impairment, 
other somatic disabilities, and psychic, intellectual or socio-medicinal disabili-
ties, the latter of which includes substance abuse. Only one type is recorded, so 
it is not known whether an individual has multiple disabilities. 
An individual may be classified as not work disabled, due to (i) having a 
disability that is not disabling enough to be classified as a work disability; (ii) 
not being disabled at all; (iii) having declined to be classified as work disabled, 
as such classification is not mandatory
7; or (iv) misreporting, i.e., classical 
measurement errors in the data. There is no way to distinguish among the pos-
sibilities (i) to (iii) in the data set, but due to its longitudinal nature we may es-
timate the reliability of the disability measures by looking at individuals who 
                                                      
7 According to the regulations, an unemployed person who does not view himself as disabled, 
and is not interested in participating in a handicap programme, should not be classified as work 
disabled. IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   12
change disability status. Arguably, individuals with disabilities that a priori can 
be expected to be of a more permanent type, e.g., hearing impairment or intel-
lectual disabilities, should be less likely to change disability status than indi-
viduals with less permanent conditions, i.e., motion impairment, psychic disor-
ders or socio-medicinal handicaps. Under the assumption of no misreporting, 
the information that the individual is not classified as work disabled can be in-
terpreted as an indication that the individual is or is not disabled, but if he or 
she is disabled, the disability is less severe than for those who are classified as 
work disabled. 
Thus the classification of work disability is rather blunt, since only inci-
dence of work disability of a certain type is recorded. There are probably addi-
tional factors, unobservable in our data, but possibly known by the PES offi-
cial, about the severity of the disability, possible multiple disabilities, work 
ability and other factors that might influence the probability that the individual 
gets a job at Samhall or participates in other handicap programmes. Further-
more, it cannot be ruled out that the incidence of work disability is to some ex-
tent influenced by factors unrelated to the disability, such as screening strin-
gency, the generosity of benefits or the chances of finding a regular job. The 
value of labour-market participation may influence the behaviour of individuals 
registered as unemployed as well as PES officials in this respect. 
Sample characteristics are presented in Table 1 for the units of analysis, i.e., 
unemployment spells of individuals with work disabilities. The table also re-
ports on characteristics for subsamples of spells terminating in participation in 
handicap programmes, i.e., Samhall and subsidised employment. There are 433 
unemployment spells ending with the person being assigned employment in 
Samhall (and 397 individuals were hired, i.e., some more than once). Subsi-
dised employment is a considerably larger programme – 3,530 unemployment 
spells ended with the individual finding such employment.  
In the full sample, the average number of unemployment spells is three, last-
ing on average 445 days. In the Samhall subsample, the average number of 
spells is somewhat smaller, but the duration is much longer, 571 days. Those 
who find employment in Samhall have also been unemployed longer than those 
who are in subsidised employment.  
On the whole, motion impairment is the most common type of disability, 
accounting for one quarter of all spells, along with socio-medicinal and other 
somatic disabilities (about 13 percent each). It is seen that spells of individuals 
with psychic or intellectual disabilities, i.e., Samhall’s prioritised groups, are IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  13 
more common among those ending with employment in the company (22 per-
cent in total) than among those in the sample as a whole (8 percent) or those 
terminating in subsidised employment (15 percent). This is an indication that 
Samhall may prioritise among groups according to the guidelines discussed 
previously.
8  However, it is not known to what extent individuals with multiple 
disabilities are recruited to Samhall, since this information is neither recorded 
in the data nor available from the company. Individuals with multiple disabili-
ties would have to make up a substantial proportion of the recruits in order to 
fulfil the goal of 40 percent recruitment from the prioritised groups.  
It can also be noted that Samhall appears to employ persons who are not 
classified as work disabled, which is not in line with the recruitment goals. 
Four percent of the Samhall spells belong to this category, while the equivalent 
figure for subsidised employment is lower, around two percent. According to  
the annual reports of the company, there are no recruits without work disabili-
ties, a discrepancy that remains to be explained.  
Changes of disability status have occurred during quite a few spells (20 per-
cent), and the most common change is from being not work disabled to being 
disabled. Such changes are most frequent in the subsample of spells preceding 
employment in Samhall, accounting for 23 percent of the spells. Changes in the 
type of disability also occur, although less frequently. 
The individuals have escaped unemployment by finding regular employ-
ment (16 percent of spells), Samhall jobs (2 percent) or subsidised employment 
(15 percent) or for “other or unknown reasons” (52 percent). These reasons 
may be retirement, education, or simply that the individual has lost contact with 
the PES office, in which case he or she may well be regularly employed.
9 Un-
fortunately, there is no possibility to identify individuals with early retirement, 
which may be an important escape route for disabled individuals. In addition, 
some spells are not completed, i.e., right-hand side censored.   
In order to get an idea about the reliability of the disability measurement, it 
is useful to examine changes of disability status. Certain types of changes may 
                                                      
8 Those among the disabled who have the smallest chance of finding regular employment (not 
shown in Table 1) are the intellectually disabled and those with a psychic disability. This sug-
gests that Samhall’ s targeting towards these groups is justified.       
9 According to Bring & Carling (2000), there is reason to believe that a fair amount of the attri-
tion in HÄNDEL is due to finding regular employment. In their sample of 168 interviewed indi-
viduals, 45 percent had found jobs at the time of attrition. Since we are mainly interested in the 
recruitment to Samhall in our study, this type of attrition should not be a major problem.       IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   14
indicate measurement errors, as argued previously. Table 2 presents sequences 
of three consecutive unemployment spells, where it is noted whether the indi-
vidual is disabled (D) or not disabled (ND). The table shows sequences of the 
form D – ND – D, by type of disability (initial and last spell). There are 347 
such individuals in the data set. About 70 percent of the individuals change 
back to the same type of disability, as indicated by the diagonal values in the 
table (the sum of which is 245). It seems highly unlikely that persons suffering 
from disabilities assumed to be of the “most permanent” type (hearing impair-
ment or intellectual disabilities) should experience such changes in disability 
status. Only 12 observations of this type can be found in the data. A formal test 
was carried out whether this proportion (12 out of 245, i.e., s1 = 0.049) is equal 
to the proportion of individuals with such impairment in the initial spells of all 
individuals (569 out of 5,780, i.e., s2 = 0.098), against a one-sided alternative 
hypothesis (s1 < s2). The null was rejected (z = -2.57). So, of all individuals 
with three consecutive spells of the D – ND – D type who change back to the 
same disability, there are significantly fewer persons with “permanent” dis-
abilities, than there are in the sample of all initial D spells (unconditional of 
subsequent disability status).  
Individuals with the “least-permanent” impairments (assumed to be motion 
impairment, psychic and socio-medicinal disabilities) exhibit a different pat-
tern, with as many as 189 individuals changing back to the same disability. 
Now we expect the proportion of individuals with “least-permanent” disabili-
ties changing back to the same disability to be larger than among all initial 
spells. An analogous test (against the alternative s1 > s2) again yielded a rejec-
tion of the null (z = 4.00, with s1 = 0.771 and s2 = 0.647). The conclusion of this 
exercise is that some misreporting of disability status probably occurs, but to a 
limited extent.
10  
    
  
                                                      
10 An alternative interpretation of the findings in Table 2 is that the no-disability status is ex-
plained by the individuals having declined to be classified as being disabled during that particular 
period, but not during the other periods. To the extent that having declined represents an attempt 
to avoid potential stigmatisation costs, this sequence of events seems unlikely.  IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  15 
4 Econometric analysis  
This section presents an econometric analysis of the recruitment of unemployed 
individuals to Samhall. The purpose is to shed further light on the recruitment 
of prioritised groups, while controlling for background characteristics such as 
age, sex and education. We do this in the framework of a duration model. Ana-
lysing the time spent in unemployment before exiting to Samhall should be of 
interest, since the welfare of the disabled as well as subsequent regular em-
ployment opportunities may be closely linked to unemployment duration. It is 
also possible to examine duration dependence, e.g., whether individuals are 
more likely, given disability status, to enter Samhall as the unemployment pe-
riod proceeds.
11 Such dependence may be due to the company’s objective to act 
as an employer of last resort, when all other possibilities to find employment 
have been exhausted. However, positive duration dependence could also indi-
cate that employment in Samhall is used in a manner not intended by the Gov-
ernment. The employment security offered at the company may shift the pref-
erences of the unemployed and PES officials towards Samhall jobs as the un-
employment period proceeds.  
The final part of this section considers exits from Samhall to outside em-
ployment, i.e., the Samhall employment duration, for the subsample of indi-
viduals who have been recruited to the company. These estimations should 
shed additional light on the reliability of our data on disability status, since the 
non-disabled should be expected to exit sooner than the disabled. If this is not 
the case, our data indicating no disability should be regarded with skepticism.   
  According to the eligibility rules, an individual may only participate in a 
handicap programme if he or she is classified as having a work disability. 
However, it should be noted that some individuals in the sample participate in 
handicap programmes without this classification: there are unemployment 
spells during which individuals were not classified as work disabled and these 
spells have ended because the individual entered a handicap programme. In the 
analysis, it is therefore assumed that all unemployment spells for the individu-
als may be terminated by the individual entering a handicap programme, not 
just the spells when the individual was classified as work disabled. 
                                                      
11 Melkersson (1999b) estimates a positive duration dependence for entry into programmes 
aimed in particular (but not exclusively) at disabled workers.   IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   16
  As noted previously, there are several sources of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the data, which may pose problems for an econometric analysis as, e.g., the 
estimated duration dependence becomes more difficult to interpret. Some of the 
variables relating to Samhall’s recruitment goals are unobserved. We lack in-
formation about the severity of the handicaps and whether there are multiple 
disabilities among the individuals in the data set. Other unobserved variables 
that may influence labour market outcomes include local unemployment, un-
employment benefits, family status and motivation. 
  It should also be noted that the data contain little information about the re-
cruitment process involving Samhall jobs, aside from the fact that a hiring has 
taken place. For example, it is not observed to what extent unemployed indi-
viduals self-select into the company, or whether applicants are rejected by 
Samhall. 
  The estimations proceed in three steps. Firstly, we focus on the determinants 
of the recruitment-to-Samhall hazard, i.e., the relative risk of leaving unem-
ployment for a job at the company, given unemployment up to that time, in a 
competing risk framework. Then we estimate the recruitment-to-Samhall haz-
ard conditional on participation in a handicap programme, i.e., Samhall and 
subsidised employment, treating exits to the latter as censored observations. 
When analysing the determinants of employment in Samhall and relating the 
results to the recruitment goals, it seems appropriate to use as a comparison the 
main alternative for the disabled, which is subsidised employment. In the final 
step, the outside-employment hazard for the subsample of Samhall employees 
is estimated.  
  For the purposes of analysing unemployment duration until recruitment in 
Samhall, a parametric Weibull baseline hazard with time-invariant covariates is 
specified, see e.g., Greene (1995). The recruitment-to-Samhall hazard, i.e., the 
probability of finding a job at the company after t days of unemployment, given 
that the individual is still unemployed, is  
 
Λt  = φ(x, β)λ0(t),                                                        (1) 
 
where x is a vector of covariates, β is a vector of parameters and λ0(t) is the 
baseline hazard, i.e., the hazard function describing the pattern of duration de-
pendence common to all individuals. (For convenience, the subscripts for indi-
viduals, escape routes and unemployment spells are suppressed.) For the 
Weibull model, the baseline hazard is IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  17 
 
λ0(t) = pt
p-1.                                                        (2) 
 
The hazard rate rises monotonically with time if p >1 and falls monotonically 
with time if p < 1. (If p=1, the hazard rate is constant and the model reduces to 
the special case known as the Exponential model.) 
  The associated survival function for the Weibull model is 
 
S(t) = exp[-φ(x, β)t
p],                                               (3) 
 
which gives the probability that a spell is of length at least t.  
    As mentioned previously, unobserved heterogeneity among the unemployed 
individuals may bias our coefficient estimates. It may also bias the estimate of 
duration dependence, p. As time passes, “survivors” increasingly comprise in-
dividuals without multiple disabilities or with less severe handicaps, as these 
are getting jobs at Samhall less quickly (if recruitment guidelines are adhered 
to). This implies that the model that does not take unobserved heterogeneity 
into account will underestimate the degree of positive duration dependence.  
  In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, we adopt the frequently 
used procedure of assuming that such effects have a Gamma distribution with 
unit mean and variance θ and enter the hazard function multiplicatively. The 
hazard function for this model is  
 
Λt  = φ(x, β)λ0(t)S(t)
θ,                                              (4) 
 
where θ = 0 corresponds to the special case of no heterogeneity, i.e., the model 
in (1). In the regressions, it is furthermore assumed that the unobserved hetero-
geneity is constant across multiple spells of the same individuals (see, e.g., 
Gutierrez, 2002). We also attempt to test for lagged duration dependence, i.e., 
whether the probability of exiting to Samhall depends on previous unemploy-
ment prior to the current spell. The length of previous unemployment is meas-
ured as the number of unemployment spells.
12  
                                                      
12 The total number of days in unemployment is the preferred measure, but this is not available 
for spells prior to 1992. It should be noted that the number of spells in unemployment is a crude 
measure of previous unemployment, since individuals with many spells may be more likely to 
have short spells.     IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   18
    The first set of maximum-likelihood estimates of the Weibull-Gamma mix-
ture model is presented in Table 3. The determinants of the hazards to Samhall 
are estimated in a competing risk framework, i.e., treating all observations with 
other escape routes as right-censored at the points of exit. This estimation 
method requires the risks to be independent conditional on the effects of the 
covariates. Three different regressions are reported, the first of which includes 
only the disability variables, with motion impairment as the reference category. 
In the second column, demographic characteristics that are likely to affect the 
probability of leaving unemployment are added: age, sex, education, with pri-
mary school as the reference, and foreign citizenship. The final column also in-
cludes dummies for the number of unemployment spells.  
  The results are presented as hazard ratios, where a coefficient greater than 
unity indicates that the covariate increases the recruitment-to-Samhall hazard. 
The estimates are rather similar across specifications. Spells of individuals who 
are not classified with a work disability are associated with much lower relative 
risks of escapes to Samhall than to other destinations, at any given unemploy-
ment duration. The estimates imply that the hazard ratio is only between 21 and 
23 percent of the hazard ratio for individuals with motion impairment. Still, no 
person should, according to the rules discussed previously, participate in a 
handicap programme if he or she is not classified as work disabled. Thus, even 
if the estimated risk is small, the fact that it is significantly larger than zero is 
noteworthy.  
The hazard ratios of the prioritised groups, i.e., individuals with psychic or 
intellectual disabilities, are the highest among all disability groups. The hazards 
are all significant and 2–3 times higher than those of the reference group. The 
remaining disability categories (except the not disabled) also exhibit hazards 
ratios larger than unity, indicating that the motion impaired are the least likely 
to exit to Samhall. Not unexpectedly, foreign nationals exhibit higher hazards 
than Swedish citizens and the hazard declines with educational level. We also 
find that the hazard is slowly decreasing with age. 
According to column (3), previous unemployment experience increases the 
hazard to Samhall. But most of the effect sets in already during the second spell 
and there is little evidence of further increases thereafter. The results do not 
suggest duration dependence within current spells, since a value of 1 for p can-
not be rejected at the 5 percent level. (Thus the Weibull reduces to the Expo-
nential model.) However, a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis of no unob-
served heterogeneity (θ
 = 0) is rejected.  IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  19 
How should the hazards pertaining to the prioritised groups be judged in re-
lation to the objectives of Samhall? Obviously, the choice of reference category 
matters. Individuals with psychic or intellectual handicaps are significantly pri-
oritised over the motion impaired, as evident in Table 3. Relative to other dis-
ability groups, this is not always the case, however. The hazards for the hearing 
and the vision impaired and individuals with heart and/or lung disease are not 
significantly different from those of the prioritised groups. Thus we find but 
partial evidence that the recruitment guidelines are adhered to.   
Table 4 reports the recruitment-to-Samhall hazard conditional on participa-
tion in a handicap programme. Observations with exits to subsidised employ-
ment are treated as right-censored. It can be argued that unobserved heteroge-
neity should be less important in these estimates, compared to the analysis on 
the full sample, reported in Table 3. On the other hand, the analysis here suffers 
from the fact that those who participate in handicap measures are probably not 
a random selection of unemployed individuals. Unfortunately, there is no suit-
able variable that is correlated with participation in handicap programmes that 
could be justifiably excluded from the recruitment-to-Samhall equation in order 
to achieve identification. But since we are mainly interested in the determinants 
of the Samhall hazard in relation to the hazard to subsidised employment, we 
regard this to be less of a problem.  
In Table 4, it is seen that spells of individuals with no disabilities are associ-
ated with a hazard ratio between seven and eight times higher than the hazard 
ratio of the reference group. Among the non-disabled entering handicap pro-
grammes, there is thus a higher hazard to Samhall than to subsidised employ-
ment, all else equal. This finding indicates cream skimming on the part of 
Samhall. 
 As in the previous table, individuals with intellectual and psychic disabili-
ties are more prone to exit to Samhall. Again, the evidence regarding prioritisa-
tion over other disability groups is mixed. There is a significant difference in 
hazards in relation to only two groups, namely the motion impaired, i.e., the 
reference, and individuals with socio-medicinal disabilities. It should be noted, 
however, the results regarding the non-disabled appear to be robust in the sense 
that the hazards are significantly higher than the hazards for all categories of 
the disabled.    
The results in Column (3) suggest a positive lagged duration dependence, 
monotonically increasing in the number of previous spells. In addition, the es-IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   20
timate of p indicates a positive, but modest, duration dependence within spells. 
Since p < 2, the hazard increases at a decreasing rate.  
  A number of robustness tests of the results were undertaken. In order to fur-
ther examine the reliability of the “no disability” coding, we investigated to 
what extent the individuals finding jobs at Samhall exit to employment outside 
the company, depending on type of disability. The results of the Weibull-
Gamma mixture regressions are presented in full in Appendix, which also de-
scribes the data. The most important finding is that the hazards for individuals 
without disabilities are higher than for the other individuals, although impre-
cisely estimated. This lends additional, albeit weak, support to the hypothesis, 
examined in Table 2, that measurement error in disability status is not a major 
concern. Thus the presence of non-disabled persons in the Samhall data seems 
not primarily to be due to errors-in-variables problems.  
  In order to assess the sensitivity of the estimates to the Weibull specification 
of the baseline hazard, all regressions in Tables 3, 4 and in the Appendix were 
rerun using the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model (see, e.g., 
Greene, 1995). Unlike the Weibull model, this formulation allows a flexible 
formulation of the baseline hazard λ0(t) in (2), i.e., no particular distribution is 
assumed. The hazard ratios, available on request, were similar to the ones ob-
tained with the Weibull models. In addition, the hazard ratios of the no disabil-




In this study, we have examined recruitment to sheltered employment in Sam-
hall, a Swedish state-owned company. According to the guidelines, workers 
with severe disabilities should be prioritised. The company should also be prof-
itable. The potential conflict between these objectives could lead to cream 
skimming in recruitment. Aside from the inherent difficulties in defining dis-
ability, the conflict may be aggravated by a number of circumstances pertaining 
to administrative routines. Firstly, important aspects of the disability, e.g., its 
severity, are not recorded by the public employment service (PES), which is re-
sponsible for assigning disabled workers to Samhall. Secondly, the PES and 
Samhall keep separate records, with different definitions, of the type of disabil-
ity. Finally, Samhall is allowed to reject assigned workers (e.g., on the grounds 
of having no job slots available at the moment).    IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  21 
Our findings indicate that the recruitment-to-Samhall hazards for persons 
with psychic or intellectual handicaps, who are included in the prioritised 
groups, are significantly higher than the hazards for some, but not all, disability 
groups. Persons with multiple disabilities should also be prioritised, but it is not 
possible to examine the recruitment of this group. This is because information 
about multiple disabilities is not recorded, neither by the PES nor by Samhall. 
In addition, the results suggest that individuals without disabilities are recruited 
to the company, which is contrary to the guidelines. However, it should be 
stressed that individuals without disabilities constitute only a minor share of the 
recruits to Samhall. We have also found that there is a positive, but slight, dura-
tion dependence in the Samhall hazard, conditional on participation in a handi-
cap programme. This result may be explained by Samhall’s role as an employer 
of last resort, when all other possibilities to find employment have been ex-
hausted. Since the job security offered at Samhall makes employment there at-
tractive, the finding could also reflect that Samhall jobs are used in a way not 
intended by the Government.   
 IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   22
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Determinants of the external employment hazard for Samhall 
employees, 1992-2003. Estimated employment duration (in days). 
Weibull-Gamma mixture model. Hazard ratios.   
Variable        (1)     (2)  (3)       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Not disabled     4.438  6.778  6.514 
   (1.39)  (1.67)  (1.62) 
 
Heart and/or lung disease    0.477  0.424  0.409 
   (0.81)  (0.83)  (0.84) 
 
Hearing impairment    4.671  5.601  4.860 
   (1.76)  (1.67)  (1.61) 
 
Other somatic disabilities   0.573  0.493 0.409 
   (0.94)  (1.06)  (1.27) 
 
Psychic disability     3.968  3.969  4.380 
   (1.90)  (1.79)  (1.92) 
 
Intellectual disability     1.562  1.526  1.322 
   (0.70)  (0.56)  (0.35) 
 
Socio-medicinal disability     0.726  0.690  0.808 
   (0.52)  (0.54)  (0.30) 
 
Female       0.456  0.457 
(1.53)  (1.47) 
 
Foreign national       0.398  0.377 
(1.41)  (1.51) 
 
Upper secondary education       2.195  2.479 
(1.73)  (1.77) 
 
Age     1.003  0.999 
(0.12)  (0.05) 
 
Second unemployment spell         1.001 
       (0.00) 
 
Third unemployment spell        0.396 
       (1.37) 
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Table A (Continued) 
Variable        (1)     (2)  (3)       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Fourth unemployment spell                0.591 
                ( 0 . 6 4 )  
 
Fifth or more unemployment spell              0.313 
                ( 1 . 4 6 )  
Duration dependence (p)      1.316    1.453  1.509 
       (1.22)   (1.38)  (1.54) 
Variance of unobserved 
heterogeneity (θ)       3.201    4.129 4.360 
       (1.30)   (1.42)  (1.57) 
 
Log  likelihood:       -207.17    -202.95  -200.70 
N: 319 
Notes: External employment is defined as regular employment or subsidised employment. All 
other destinations were treated as right-censored, i.e., a competing risk model was estimated. In-
formation on the duration of employment and causes of escape up to January 2, 2003 were ob-
tained directly from Samhall. The data include the latest Samhall spell only. If the exit (to Sam-
hall) dates in HÄNDEL did not match the entry dates in the Samhall data, the spells were ex-
cluded. After the exclusions, there were 319 observations remaining in the data, with 63 exits to 
external employment. See also notes to Table 3. IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   26
Table 1: Sample characteristics. Unemployment spells of individuals with work 
disabilities, 1992-99. Means.
  
Characteristics       All  Spells  preceding  hcp  programme
       spells      ___________________________   
         S a m h a l l   S u b s .   e m p l o y m e n t  
Age        37.8  38.8  41.4   
Female        0.420 0.402 0.342   
Primary  education      0.478 0.552 0.546   
Upper  secondary  education     0.470 0.423 0.408 
University  education      0.052 0.025 0.046   
Foreign  citizenship      0.100 0.164 0.062 
Previous employment in Samhall      0.013  0.134    0.022 
Average number of unemployment spells    3.0    2.7  2.5 
Average duration of unemployment spells (days)  445    571  384 
Type of disability      
  - Heart and/or lung disease      0.021    0.044  0.030 
  -  Hearing  impairment     0.018    0.042 0.026 
  -  Vision  impairment     0.010    0.021 0.018 
  -  Motion  impairment     0.261    0.309 0.388 
  - Other somatic disabilities      0.123    0.185  0.163 
  - Psychic disability        0.053    0.115  0.079 
  - Intellectual disability        0.031    0.109  0.067 
 -  Socio-medicinal  disability    0.131    0.139 0.210 
  -  None       0.352    0.037    0.019   
Change of disability status        0.201   0.240  0.173   
  - From not disabled to disabled      0.137    0.226  0.170 
  - From disabled to not disabled      0.064    0.014  0.003 
Change of type of disability        0.018    0.028  0.027 
Escape  route        
  -  Regular  employment     0.164 
  -  Samhall       0.018 
  - Subsidised employment       0.148 
  - Other or unknown         0.523 
  - None  (right censored spells)      0.146       
 
N 23,878  433  3,530   IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  27 
Table 2: Changes of disability status, by type of disability. Subsample of individuals 
with three consecutive unemployment spells of the type “disability – no disability – 
disability”. 
Disability at end spell     HL  H  V  M  OS  P  I  SM  All 
Disability at initial spell      
  Heart and/or lung disease (HL)    4  0  0      2    2    0     0      3    11   
  Hearing impairment (H)      0  4  0      0    0    1    0      0      5 
  Vision impairment (V)      0  0  2      0    0    0    0      0      2    
  Motion impairment (M)      0  0  0    74  13    5    1      6    99   
  Other somatic disabilities (OS)    3  0  0    17  38    1    2      6    67   
  Psychic disability  (P)      0  0  0      5    3  15    0      6    29   
  Intellectual disability (I)      0  0  0      2    2    0    8      3    15   
  Socio-medicinal disability (SM)    0  0  0    10    4    4    1  100  119 
  All          7  4  2  110  62  26  12  124  347      
Note:  The subsample consists of individuals registered as having a disability during the first and third 
unemployment spells, but no disability during the second spell.  IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall   28
Table 3: Determinants of the recruitment-to-Samhall hazard, 1992-99. 
Estimated unemployment duration (in days).  Weibull-Gamma mixture model.  
Hazard ratios.  
Variable        (1)     (2)      (3)     
_____________________________________________________________________________
Not  disabled      0.233 0.212 0.215 
    (5.37) (5.68) (5.62) 
 
Heart and/or lung disease    1.738  1.882  1.882 
    (1.96) (2.21) (2.22) 
 
Hearing  impairment    2.012 1.817 1.893 
    (2.37) (2.02) (2.16) 
 
Vision  impairment      1.729 1.559 1.546 
    (1.37) (1.10) (1.08) 
 
Other somatic disabilities    1.284 1.254 1.256 
    (1.59) (1.43) (1.44) 
 
Psychic disability     2.032  1.995  1.966 
    (3.73) (3.61) (3.54) 
 
Intellectual disability     3.097  2.559  2.690 
    (5.49) (4.36) (4.58) 
 
Socio-medicinal disability      1.450 1.224 1.151 
    (2.14) (1.12) (0.77) 
 
Female       0.813  0.818 
(1.80)  (1.75) 
 
Foreign national       1.968  2.002 
(4.31)  (4.41) 
 
Upper secondary education       0.735  0.734 
(2.66)  (2.67) 
 
University education       0.332  0.326 
(3.27)  (3.32) 
 
Age     0.985  0.987 
(2.76)  (2.39) 
 
Second  unemployment  spell      1.514 
      (2.96) 
 
Third unemployment spell         1.265 
      (1.41) IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  29 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Variable        (1)     (2)      (3)     
 
Fourth unemployment spell                1.432 
                 ( 1 . 8 3 )  
 
Fifth or more unemployment spell              1.603 
                 ( 2 . 4 7 )    
 
Duration dependence (p)      1.041    1.054  1.064 
       (0.99)   (1.30)  (1.50) 
 
Variance of unobserved      4.127    3.852  3.746 
heterogeneity (θ)       (4.59)    (4.55)  (4.51) 
 
Log  likelihood:       -2,233.93    -2,211.90  -2,206.45 
N: 23,878 
Notes: Absolute values of z-statistics in parentheses. Models estimated with unobserved hetero-
geneity of the Gamma type, shared among multiple spells of the same individuals. The reference 
category for the disability variables (including not disabled) is motion impairment and the refer-
ence for the education variables is primary school.  
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Table 4: Determinants of the recruitment-to-Samhall hazard, conditional on 
participation in handicap programmes, 1992-99. Estimated unemployment 
duration (in days).  Weibull-Gamma mixture model. Hazard ratios.  
Variable        (1)     (2)      (3)   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Not  disabled      7.586 7.393 7.609 
    (5.90) (5.95) (6.19) 
 
Heart and/or lung disease    1.480  1.914  2.005 
    (1.34) (2.23) (2.39) 
 
Hearing  impairment    1.455 1.361 1.446 
    (1.23) (1.02) (1.24) 
 
Vision  impairment      0.966 0.911 0.954 
    (0.09) (0.23) (0.12) 
 
Other somatic disabilities    1.354 1.297 1.384 
    (1.84) (1.57) (1.99) 
 
Psychic disability     1.862  1.779  1.763 
    (3.16) (2.90) (2.91) 
 
Intellectual disability     1.709  1.386  1.512 
    (2.60) (1.52) (1.95) 
 
Socio-medicinal disability      1.107 1.026 0.878 
    (0.58) (0.14) (0.72) 
 
Female       1.241  1.240 
(1.83)  (1.85) 
 
Foreign national       2.530  2.668 
(5.58)  (5.94) 
 
Upper secondary education       0.711  0.698 
(2.84)  (3.03) 
 
University education       0.266  0.266 
(3.78)  (3.80) 
 
Age     0.979  0.983 
(3.55)  (2.95) 
 
Second unemployment spell         1.475 
      (2.70) 
 
Third unemployment spell        1.897 
      (3.63) IFAU – Recruitment to Samhall  31 
Table 4 (Continued) 
Variable        (1)     (2)      (3)   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Fourth unemployment spell                2.207 
                 ( 3 . 8 6 )  
 
Fifth or more unemployment spell              3.029 
                 ( 5 . 6 0 )    
 
Duration dependence (p)      1.189    1.198  1.224 
       (3.77)   (3.91)  (4.39) 
 
Variance of unobserved      1.257    1.078  0.924 
heterogeneity (θ)       (3.43)    (3.29)  (3.00) 
 
Log  likelihood:       -1,479.43    -1,447.43  -1,428.85 
N: 3,963 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.  
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